tldw, per Blancolirio: unstable approach, crew should have done a go around at 1000 agl but did not attempt one until it was too late, then aborted the go around.
I think the real question is why didn't the pilots do a go around. I bet there are underlying pressures from the airlines and/or amazon to not do a go around to avoid schedule delays or fuel costs.
Airlines in the US do not pressure pilots to avoid go arounds. Pilots in the US do not delegate life or death decisions to ops, especially since the FAA legally holds them accountable for that. All pilots are aware that they are responsible for the decision to go around or not.
Any airline found to be pressuring pilots to avoid go arounds would be in a world of pain with the FAA.
On cargo flights in particular timing and fuel usage are less critical than passenger flights, and a go around doesn't affect either much.
Pressure to avoid go arounds would also be incredibly counter productive since go arounds exist to preserve life and property. Pilots do go arounds to avoid costly incidents.
You are correct that the question is why they didn't do a go around, but I would bet a large sum of money that airline pressure to avoid go arounds was not a factor.
> The Amazon Prime Air Boeing 767 cargo plane that crashed off a Miami runway on Sunday, killing five people, was operated by a North Carolina company that has been accused by past employees of violating safety regulations, legal documents reveal.
There's a lot in the article, but this allegation is worth highlighting:
> Seuring's attorney, Michael Anello, told the judge that another 21 Air pilot, Johnny Salmonson, "was being pressured to fly in periods of time that were too short to comply with the proper amounts of rest, and that implicated safety. The layovers were too short."
Notably, none of those allegations from the fired former chief(!) pilot actively suing the company while appealing his rejected OSHA case touch on in-flight procedures.
If any of those are true, it will be very bad for the carrier, but they are not related to any of the failures being reported on.
Get-there-itis is absolutely a thing. No big airline would be dumb enough to say it that stuff explicitly but the pressures still exist.
There have been accidents around the world where pilots were trying to save fuel, get off work at a normal time instead of 2 hours extra holding, not wanting to divert and not be home, try to get on the ground so they don’t go over their max hours for the day, etc.
Yes it’s counterproductive. *It happens*. External or internal, it happens.
The worst aviation accident ever had this as a major contributing factor, the KLM plane at Tenerife was almost near their maximum crew time so if they didn't take off soon they'd have to stay overnight.
That one did lead to major regulatory changes. It wasn't in the US though but there was an American plane involved (which was not to blame)
Yep, that 49 year old disaster led to major changes, which is why I’m dubious that corporate pressure was involved here.
Note: Both planes were American. One of the carriers was not. NTSB gets involved whenever it is a US carrier OR manufacturer, so they have a ton more data than just US carrier incidents.
There have already been crashes where one contributing factor was pressure to land and avoid any kind of delay - even if risky.
Remember that pressure doesn’t need to be explicit. It can be the result of all kinds of factors - including physical. Maybe they were already late and pilots with fewer “on time” arrivals are lower in line for promotions. We already have stories from Amazon delivery drivers and it’s not insane to think some of that culture has leaked through to other aspects.
And high levels of stress can lead people to break rules. People lose the cognitive faculties needed for compliance. Even things that person personally believes and agrees with.
Southwest airlines had a culture of turning around fast at the gate. So maybe no explicit policy but culture can drive unintended consequences and decisions.
Fast gate turnarounds have nothing to do with what happens in the cockpit. That affects the cleaning crews.
Take a look at Southwest's safety record. I believe they have 1 fatality due to an air incident in their history due to an uncontained engine failure that was not related to maintenance.
>Airlines in the US do not pressure pilots to avoid go arounds. Pilots in the US do not delegate life or death decisions to ops,
Construction companies in the US do not pressure employees to get shit done. Construction workers do not delegate the decisions to work in sketchy circumstances, especially since OSHA holds them accountable for all that.
See how silly that sounds?
They cook up the rules to be all compliant and whatnot and then everyone breaks them a little pretty often and in tasteful ways in order to actually get the job done. If you get caught or screw up, it's on you.
I assume this sort of pressure happens a lot less with pilots because of the cost of screw ups but there's still probably some implied pressure there.
The only thing silly is comparing the construction industry to the airline industry. Construction is pretty notorious for openly encouraging unsafe work environments, airlines are not.
Airlines are much more tightly bound by the FAA than any construction company is to any regulatory agency. Airlines have to get permission to let their pilots read documents off an iPad instead of paper, for example. It just isn't a good comparison to compare the most safety aware industry on earth to one famous for ignoring safety rules.
I've worked construction. I have a pilots license in multiple countries (including the US). They aren't the same.
Pilot gets more veto power than the crane guy who gets more veto power than the residential concrete crew but they all still get talked to if they can't get their jobs done.
I didn't say the same. I said the pressure was probably there too. But you can construe it as the former because that's a way easier thing to argue with.
I assume that since the NTSB database makes every single incident investigation public you can point to at least one instance where an ATP was pressured into avoiding a go around?
I mean... The problem is common enough that there are industry specific terms to describe it. Go search that database for "commercial pressure" and I'm certain you'll find what your sealioning self is demanding from everyone else.
Can you point me to one of the specific incidents you are citing since both the new search and the old search seem to be broken for that specific term?
Edit: just to be clear: I’m not saying that companies don’t pressure transportation workers into bad decisions. My original supposition is that I have never heard of, nor would it make any sense, for a US airline to have a policy of avoiding go arounds. “Land rhe plane on the first try, or else…” is an exceptionally stupid policy.
There is one thing an airline never wants to have happen and it is a fatal accident. Everything else is secondary. Having one caused by corporate policy would lead to mass exodus of passengers.
21Air isn't a passenger airline though, it's cargo. It's conceivable that they have lower standards, hire less experienced pilots, and just don't emphasize safety culture in the same way that passenger airlines do.
This is based on my understanding from several pilots who have weighted in.
The cockpit voice recorder transcript has the copilot repeatedly saying "we're coming in too fast" but the pilot never clearly acknolwedges.
The copilot ought to have been more assertive and said "We need to go around. NOW."
The pilot shouldn't have needed that. He should have made the call himself, but even if he was unsure, once his copilot called that he should have done the right thing.
Neither of them will ever fly again. The only question now is if either of them will go to prison. There's already a civil wrongful death lawsuit against them.
In one of the videos you can see dark clouds behind the plane. I suspect the pilots knew they'd have to divert to a different airport if they couldn't land and put pressure on themselves to not have to do that.
Normalization of deviance. While there may have been some pressure from corporate or whatever, my guess is that the pilot flying was the one who only got his type rating a few months ago and that he'd done this at least a few times before in another type and gotten away with it. Now in a bigger, less nimble craft, he didn't.
I suspect the pilots knew it wasn't a great approach but it just didn't click how bad it was. They just felt committed to the approach and thought they could 'fix it' without realizing how bad things really were. Having good enough situational awareness that you wave off when you are supposed to generally means that you also aren't wildly off speed/other parameters. They clearly had lost situational awareness.
The thing that amazes me about this is the timeline here:
00:30 The nose and right main gear touched down at a groundspeed of 158 knots.
...
00:19 The left main gear touched down at a groundspeed of 134 knots.
00:15 A pilot called for a go-around.
11 seconds and 24 knots after the nose touched down and then the left main finally also touched down? Wow. Then 4 seconds after all that the go-around. It is one thing to hold the nose off for that long, but a main mount?!
The branding on the plane is Prime Air, but it's not actually Amazon owned and run. Instead it's a cargo airline (21 Air) that they contract with to operate cargo flights with Prime Air livery on the planes.
It'll be interesting to see the outcome of the NTSB investigation, they're usually quite thorough.
CH Robinson, though, just lost a lawsuit at the Supreme Court with similar premises. They are a freight forwarder and third-party logistics outfit that contracts large amounts of capacity with subcontractors (airlines, trucking companies, shipping lines, etc.) and sells a complete package to their clients.
One of CHR's service providers was conducting hiring shenanigans and not fully, legally screening their drivers. One of the service provider's drivers hit another vehicle and crippled that vehicle's driver, who sued. CHR argued all liability should fall on the trucking company who hired the driver. The Supreme Court said no, CHR could be held liable for negligence in vetting their service provider as well, because it was ultimately CHR's load being carried.
I'm not a lawyer, but under that legal precedent, it seems Amazon might not be off the hook for damages in this case, given it was their subcontractor who was carrying Amazon cargo in a jet with "Prime Air" on the side.
Yep, its also the most intuitive way to reason about it when you look at the data. Unfortunately, a bad call. I'm sure many of us would have made the same mistake.
> I'm sure many of us would have made the same mistake.
From the reporting and commenting on this incident, that is not the impression I'm getting. This wasn't one bad call after getting half way down the runway, this was a continuous stream of bad decision making for the entire approach, with the copilot suggesting the pilot go around too.
Also: this kind of incident is very rare, so obviously, the vast majority of pilots don't make this mistake.
Private pilot here. No, I'm quite sure very few of you here would have made the same mistake as evidenced by the fact that literally hundreds of thousands of aircraft land successfully every day, many of them under much more adverse conditions. This is not a oh-it-could-have-happened-to-anyone kind of screwup, this is a did-this-guy-really-go-through-basic-pilot-training kind of screwup.
I’m not a manned pilot, but have my part 107 and have spent a few thousand hours flying combat flight sims - ~150kts in a cargo aircraft, four seconds from departing the runway, seems like the worst possible time to abort a touch-and-go. Then consider the numerous automated audio warnings and the copilot suggesting a go-around, and it seems pretty ridiculous to me.
Don’t get me wrong - if I had to land that plane, I’d likely have overrun the runway too. I’m not saying it’s easy, only that it appears to me that they were operating well outside the documented parameters that are the pilot’s responsibility to know.
I just looked it up, and a 767’s Vref is 122-165kts, with Vref at max weight at 144kts. They touched down at 158kts, nose down. The approach was ~35kts over speed, they were above the glide slope, and not bleeding speed fast enough to sink - so they dropped the nose.
From what I can see, they were screwed the moment they touched down - the last moment they had a reasonable opportunity to abort was when they decided to drop the nose and commit instead.
They could have “aborted” at almost any time prior to when they did. And even that may have been fine if they had stuck with it.
A decent rule of thumb in aviation (and life…) is that you’re allowed to change your mind once. Waffling kills more people than switching to a bad decision does.
I have a strong hunch there a deeper more human/emotional component involved. Like Pilot A was not in the right mental headspace. A bad breakup? Some other kind of personal loss? Or an urgency of a personal kind?
Those are a few situations when a trained individual could make a series of bad decisions. More so if they were forced into the situation (flying) despite raising objections. It has happened to other 21 Air pilots in the past - when they objected to flying but were forced, so who knows?
Absolutely does not absolve this individual of the incident. It’s a burden they’ll have to bear for the rest of their lives. But it could help explain why?
They made a series of at least ten (and that's kind of charitable) this-must-never-happen mistakes that likely rise to the level of extraordinary criminal negligence, including ignoring checklists, alarms, configuring the plane for landing in general, and basically everything related to safety.
You don't have to extend sympathy, just as you don't have to extend sympathy to drunk drivers who kill people.
I am not a pilot and I don't know anything about flying. I can go along with the idea that the pilot / crew made mistakes. So the next obvious question is how do we make sure this does not happen again?
I am not a pilot nor do I know aviation but I sincerely doubt the air traffic controller on duty has the mental capacity to babysit each and every plane that is departing and arriving second guessing each and every decision they make. I don't know if they even have access to all the data the pilots have and even if they did I don't know if they can make decisions on time. I mean the way I see it the ATC will coordinate with grounds crew to make sure a plane can land/crash land as safely as possible even if it has no engines, wheels, or even flaps. I don't know how but I know they will try their best to coordinate everyone the best they can.
I mean, complete ethical nihilism is one way to try to avoid losing this particular argument, but I don't think you'll get many people to agree with you on it.
You're being downvoted because actual qualified aviators are telling you how egregious of a mistake this looks to be, and you're quibbling with them without any professional credibility on the subject.
In any aviation incident, it’s generally a good idea to wait for the full NTSB report before drawing any firm conclusions.
That said, it is exceedingly difficult to find any explanation for what happened in this case that doesn’t boil down to incompetence or gross negligence.
There were so many opportunities to avoid this accident. The crew seemingly more or less single-handedly punched a hole straight through the entire Swiss cheese model. It’s so bad it’s hard to imagine they weren’t drunk at the controls.
This is honestly one of the few cases where it looks so blatantly and obviously negligent that I'm comfortable commenting ahead of the investigation results.
Even in a case where someone has drilled themselves into a mountainside, there's value in trying to see things like "were they distracted? Was there mechanical failure? Did they have a freak medical emergency and get incapacitated? Did unexpected weather crop up?" And in other cases, it's a "but for the grace of God go I" moment where you understand how they could have made the wrong decision in good faith. Even years out of the cockpit, I'm willing to give most aviators the benefit of the doubt, because God knows I screwed up enough in my day.
But the only thing I can think of that compares to this level of negligence was the F/A-18 pilot 20 or so years ago who lost his wings after booming his non-towered hometown airport at over 500 knots and below 500 feet with absolutely zero pre-authorization or waiver from the FAA for that kind of thing.
They've changed business model from selling software (windows, office, terminal server) to selling services (cloud services, user surveillance/exfil, advertising). The OS is just a vehicle to drive those service streams: maybe it's even a loss leader?
Bob is a genius, sure, and has a little voice acting, and yes dark comedy, but why would he have been especially fitting for Looney Tunes style silliness?
His voice acting in Tim & Eric regarding the Cinco line of products seems to go right along with the humor of the iconic Acme brand. I think he'd be great at this.
The video explains it pretty well. There's a spring loaded plunger in that IBIS sensor that can be seen visually by mechanics on the ground. When the pressure drops, the plunger retracts, showing a visual indication. At the same time, it also removes the rad source from its shielding when it does that, increasing emissions for the in flight sensor to see.
There is a guy on YouTube playing with SC-40s who has part of the TOPS-10 based stack, which I guess is what you mean. The Internetty stuff went by the umbrella name of HMI (Host-Micro Interface) and was guarded like the recipe for Coca-Cola. The boundary between the server and client was...fractal. Everything was about saving/spoofing bandwidth. The "browser", WinCIM, contained a huge library of UI element templates.
Systems Concepts may have had other prospects, but they had so much trouble getting the product out the door that Compuserve ultimately helped them finish it, licensed it (? exclusively), and produced all but a couple of the machines that went into production. I found a microcode bug in one of the first SC-built machines that caused the string-comparison instruction to return true whether or not; Gary Brown took that to SC and reported their reaction as "Damn, you caught us!", and that was kind of the end of that. You might have some stories to tell of the flight from X.25...?
I am from a place where CompuServe was just something you read about the way you read travelogues or otherwise reports from far away country, unfortunately.
I encountered data about System Concepts due to being interested in PDP-10 history and so on.
It was one of multiple successors to PDP-10 that tried to capitalize on existing user base after Digital decided to utterly cancel all 36bit work in favour of VAX (legends claim the last prototype ended up in millpond).
Some started even earlier, trying to compete on speed or other attributes (like Foonly)
System Concepts is the ones who ended up with CompuServe as client/effective owner from my memory. XKL was somewhat successful to the point they are the reason why last known PDP-10 was made after closure of last VAX manufacturing line, but nearly all of their systems was for internal use in their network gear
There were options for migrating from PDP-11, not PDP-10.
PDP-11 was a 16bit byte-addressable minicomputer that was extended to 22 bit physical addresses through MMU. VAX took PDP-11 and extended it into 32bit flat addressable paged system.
PDP-10 was 36-bit, word-addressed with 18bit addressing (plus segment extensions in KL-B that were only really implemented in 3rd party follow-ons, a mainframe-in-all-but-name.
VAX would mean starting from zero unless nearly everything was written very high-level, which is doubtful given the optimizations needed to run so many simultaneous users.
It had more to do with the ecosystems and the corporate relationship. The -10s came from a earlier perspective. It was open source before "open source". You bought the software and you got the source, because of course you did, you couldn't even install it otherwise. Compuserve tracked TOPS-10 up to version 6.01, with their own additions and patches: far-reaching but well encapsulated. They could not track 6.03, so they "forked" it, to use the modern word. The question of support was always fraught. Compuserve offered all of their changes to DEC, who mostly sniffed at them. But from DEC's perspective, one of the major purposes of the VAX platform was to lock all that kind of thing down and go to a support model more like that of IBM.
Another part was pretty vicious infighting between PDP-10 (already sorta on thin ice from start due to fuckup that was PDP-6) and PDP-11/VAX teams, and VAX team won it pretty decisively - if in part through consolidation efforts.
EDIT: Another major difference was how PDP-10 was from an era where everyone with a (under)graduate students to throw at the problem was making custom modifications to hardware.
Like some early multiprocessor PDP-10 being done with hand-soldered MP bus done by students.
If someone spends a trillion building out AI while saying the quiet part out loud, "stop hiring humans", then maybe they should be paying half of that towards a Ubi fund for everyone they're displacing.
There is absolutely no reason to read those contracts any more. As Louis Rossman keeps pointing out, most of them now include the ability for them to change terms at any time. That's basically the null contract.
Since the legal system has once again failed to protect users from corporations, it's up to users to use technical means for self defense.
Depends on jurisdiction, just because someone wrote something in a contract doesn’t mean it’s binding.
In Poland/EU we have an (ever growing) list of forbidden clauses that even when written and signed by consumer are null and void. And I think these can be enacted retroactively - when corporations invent new shady clauses, government steps in and tells them these are invalid.
This helps to even out the consumer-corporation field.
> we have an (ever growing) list of forbidden clauses that even when written and signed by consumer are null and void
I'm pretty sure that's true almost everywhere. Law beats contract. The real question is how strong the laws are. In the US not so much because of small government and stuff, especially in red states.
The law matters very little when enforcing it in court often means a multiyear lawsuit against an opponent which employs an army of attorneys, has effectively unlimited amounts of money, will likely cost you ruinious sums of money, and for an outcome that's far from guaranteed.
You can do that too. You can show up, represent yourself and pay a few hundred dollar court fee, while the big company has to waste hundreds of thousands of dollars to defend themselves from you. You'll probably lose the case if you don't have a lawyer, but in a place like the US, you don't have to pay the other side's legal fees unless the case is frivolous (which it won't be).
>The law matters very little when enforcing it in court often means a multiyear lawsuit against an opponent which employs an army of attorneys, has effectively unlimited amounts of money, will likely cost you ruinious sums of money, and for an outcome that's far from guaranteed.
Or when you can't even enforce anything in court as you've already given up your right to spend all your money suing, as binding arbitration is the required and only mechanism to "resolve disputes." To make it extra fair, the corporation pays the arbitration firm for their "objective" decisions and not you.
Has it actually happened that someone went to court and the court told them no, you have to do binding arbitration? Or is it just something they put in the contract to scare you? Has anyone argued they didn't actually agree to what the country thinks they agreed to? You could start by just saying no, you didn't agree to that, and the company will have to prove you did.
In the Gamer's Nexus video, he gets drunk before accepting the terms so that it isn't legal consent. A drunk person can't enter a contract.
>Has it actually happened that someone went to court and the court told them no, you have to do binding arbitration? Or is it just something they put in the contract to scare you? Has anyone argued they didn't actually agree to what the country thinks they agreed to? You could start by just saying no, you didn't agree to that, and the company will have to prove you did.
The judiciary is a branch of government. But more crucially, some countries have better consumer protection agencies, eliminating the need for people to go through costly court battles for common sense stuff.
Interestingly, in Brazil and I'm sure in some other legislations, those contracts are essentially void because there's a presumption the average person does not have the time, patience, or ability to understand every clause—so they are by definition unable to agree to their terms.
I'd love to have a similar standard applied in the US but I'm not holding my breath.
Which doesnt work. LG tvs will scan for availible networks. Someone setting up a new router within range briefly disables encryption and "your" tv will jump on that network and transmit all the stored data.
I guess you could remove the wifi antenna, or otherwise brick the wifi reception ability (faraday cage, lead block, etc). Or - just boycott LG. I'll never buy any of that corporate espionage nonsense, ever.
Also: the US intelligence agencies used Echelon ages ago to monitor what vast swaths of innocent people were up to. I think it's sensible to presume they've got their hooks into these devices too.
A technical solution would presumably spoof the spaff but with E2EE and DoH is it possible? So then what, hacking firmware? I guess then TVs get a hard lifespan limit.
This reminded me about the US nutters advocating return to the "way things were": they would do well to consider life expectancy. My draw from 1881 Mississippi would max out at 36.
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