The maturity value of a bond/mbs is not really the true value at a given time between it being issued and maturing. You can treat it that way as a person holding the bond if you pinky-promise to yourself to not sell until maturity, but since banks need to periodically sell these to let customers get their deposits, that fiction doesn’t work for them.
These things trade on the open market and adjust to interest rate changes. What really happened is that they bought a bunch of securities backed by depositors that lost value at mark-to-market. This is poor risk management, not some unfortunate unavoidable issue caused by a bank run. They are insolvent at market prices - illiquidity would be more like they have a bunch of contracts or snowflake assets (like buildings, or a security that doesn’t trade on the open market).
As a depositor, saying “in 10 years you will get the full value of your deposit back” is bullshit: you could give me the actual reduced value now, and I could invest it in the same kind of instrument, and in 10 years I’d also have the full value back - but I could do other things with it too, which may be preferable considering it’s my deposit that I may need to spend now rather than in 10 years.
The fear is that many other banks are in the same position, that they are technically underwater and vulnerable to runs because the true value of their deposit-backed assets have decreased due to interest rate increases, but that SVB was affected first because their customer base of VC-backed businesses just happened to have their withdrawal:deposit ratio increase the most.
The regulation to my knowledge does require marking to maturity. Yes as I have commented elsewhere in this post, all banks do this.
SVB had the unique situation of being the canary in the mine, as they had to get a lot of MBS during low interest rates of 2021/2020. Your question is the jackpot one, yes: how many other banks are following closely by.
If the Fed continues or increases the rate hike I would be surprised if we don't hear more -- assuming no other action.
The silver lining might be that SVB might give the heads up for the Fed, FDIC and government to act.
Sure that is the regulation, but just because it’s a regulation doesn’t mean it’s all you should do for risk management, it’s just the bare minimum.
If the present value of a bank’s assets are lower than the present value of deposits, that is insolvency: calling it illiquidity just because the bank doesn’t want to sell its actually-liquid underwater assets right now is a cop-out.
These things trade on the open market and adjust to interest rate changes. What really happened is that they bought a bunch of securities backed by depositors that lost value at mark-to-market. This is poor risk management, not some unfortunate unavoidable issue caused by a bank run. They are insolvent at market prices - illiquidity would be more like they have a bunch of contracts or snowflake assets (like buildings, or a security that doesn’t trade on the open market).
As a depositor, saying “in 10 years you will get the full value of your deposit back” is bullshit: you could give me the actual reduced value now, and I could invest it in the same kind of instrument, and in 10 years I’d also have the full value back - but I could do other things with it too, which may be preferable considering it’s my deposit that I may need to spend now rather than in 10 years.
The fear is that many other banks are in the same position, that they are technically underwater and vulnerable to runs because the true value of their deposit-backed assets have decreased due to interest rate increases, but that SVB was affected first because their customer base of VC-backed businesses just happened to have their withdrawal:deposit ratio increase the most.