They don't need to join the EU to use the euro. There are countries that use the U.S. dollar even though they're not the U.S. Sometimes it's just de facto use the dollar. There is technically a local currency and people use it when forced to but they would prefer the dollar. If you're a small country, something like the dollar or the euro is probably your best bet because of the stability it affords. The advantage to joining the EU is Iceland gets a little bit of input on how the euro was run versus if you use the dollar of the euro when you're not a member of their respective country you are partially tying your financial stability to something that you have no input or control over.
This means giving up all the advantages of central banking and is generally only done informally by countries experiencing hyperinflation without capital controls. It's a marker of a failed state.
I remember in live TV debates for the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, the Yes leader insisted that Scotland could not be prevented from using the Pound sterling. It's technically true, but a very, very bad idea.
> This means giving up all the advantages of central banking and is generally only done informally by countries experiencing hyperinflation without capital controls. It's a marker of a failed state.
The US did not have a central bank until 1914. And there was zero net inflation from 1800-1914. The central bank introduced endemic inflation, which appeared immediately.
By design. Having a slightly positive inflation rate gives you a cushion against deflation, which tends to cause market crashes. A currency I can be confident will lose a couple percent yearly is more useful than one that might be worth wildly different amounts year to year.
If you scroll down a bit on this page, you can see the massive inflation/deflation spikes in ~10yr cycles that existed prior to central banking.
You're completely missing the point. The Fed did a fantastic job, because they could have given a pretty good estimate of that number in 1914. If you had asked someone in 1814 what a dollar would be worth in 1914, hell, 1824, they would have been guessing, and been wildly wrong.
Making sure that the nitwits stuffing their mattresses with dollar bills maintain their net worth is not the goal of our monetary policy, nor is a good goal. The goal is to ensure predictability.
To this end, we can model the price level at some point in time in a way similar to how we model compounding interest: P(t) = P(0) * (1.0 + r)^t. Take P(0) = 1.0, r = 0.032, and t = 2026-1914 = 112. Then, P(112) = 1.0 * (1.032)^112 = 34.05. We've had an average 3.2% rate of inflation in the price level over the past 112 years, give or take.
We can make certain assumptions that the rate of inflation won't be far off from this when we evaluate certain financial risks.
Just as in modeling adjustable interest rates for compounding interest, we can make r depend on t, and at that point, it becomes an ODE problem: dP/dt = r(t) * P(t).
This betrays a lack of understanding of nominal versus real debt dynamics. (And also taxes, but I'll admit that my upbringing has probably given me a unique perspective on Caesar and what it means for us to be able to use his money.)
Of particular note, debt instruments are denominated in nominal dollars, and they're paid back in nominal dollars, but what concerns the creditor is the real value of those nominal payments. Economic growth has this pernicious habit of pushing nominal prices upward, and if the money supply and credit system don't grow commensurate with the resulting increased demand for liquidity, the real burden of existing nominal debts can rise sharply and unpredictably.
This means that borrowers can find themselves underwater on, e.g., mortgages while the nominal obligations remain fixed, and banks will swiftly foreclose on them and tighten credit when considering their balance sheets. Many of the panics of the 1800's included a lot of this very dynamic.
Montenegro unilaterally uses the euro and it doesn't seem to otherwise be a failed state. Besides this being a "marker", what do you think are the actual problems caused? Like why does a small country need its own capital controls when there is a very stable currency available nearby?
The reason for your own currency is you can set your own interest rates to fit your local economy. If you are in a local recession while others are doing well you might want lower interest rates, while others need them higher. Both places are trying to make the same balance of inflation vs stimulating the economy - but they need different answers.
I'm not convinced it is worth it. Generally world economies are tightly tied anyway and so what is right for large currencies is close enough for everybody. The less coupled you are to the world the more important it is that you can be different.
Not significantly. Your point that only failed states decide to use another nation's currency is automatically a failed state is simply untrue. It can be a marker, but it's not an automatic mark. Montenegro is not a failed state.
They don't give up the advantages of central banking at all.
What they give up is political control of their bank. There are advantages to having political control, but often political control is abused - which is why failed states have given up on it as part of their efforts to rebound. The US and EU both have controls in place to limit the power of politicians from making changes for political reasons.
It would, and this has been an issue even with bigger eurozone countries, like Greece.
Basically the same pressure that would have adjusted your exchange rates instead adjusts how much of the fixed-rate currency exists in your country. With fluctuating rates the pain of a financial outflow is more evenly spread than with a government running out of money, unless the government adjusts taxes to compensate.
