It's about users though. You do SSL for the users, not for your sake. If you as the server owner trust the government behind, say, .ch, then that's fine for you. But if browsers supported DANE, then all of the browsers users would also have to trust the government behind .ch.

Or rather: The users trust the browsers to show an SSL warning if there's an indication that the connection is being MITMd.

Today, the browsers trust (hand-picked, subjected to stringent rules) CAs to tell them whether a connection is being MITMd or not and they then tell the users.

In the case of DANE, the UI to the user is the same (Blow up or don't blow up), so the trust given by the user to the browser is also the same, but now the browsers can't rely on CAs which they control to some extent (using said rules and monetary incentives), but they must rely on governments, often without oversight or clue and with all the incentives to MITM connections.

That means that by trusting DANE, browsers force users to also trust DANE and users might not want to trust some or all of the entities behind DNSSec.